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Abstract 
Facial identity and emotional expression are two important sources of 
information for daily social interaction. However the link between these two aspects 
of face processing has been the focus of an unresolved debate for the past 3 decades. 
Three views have been advocated: (1) separate and parallel processing of identity and 
emotional expression signals derived from faces; (2) asymmetric processing with the 
computation of emotion in faces depending on facial identity coding but not vice 
versa; and (3) integrated processing of facial identity and emotion. We present studies 
with healthy participants that primarily apply methods from mathematical 
psychology, formally testing the relations between the processing of facial identity 
and emotion. Specifically, we focused on the ‘Garner’ paradigm, the composite face 
effect and the divided attention tasks. We further ask whether the architecture of face-
related processes is fixed or flexible and whether (and how) it can be shaped by 
experience. We conclude that formal methods of testing the relations between 
processes show that the processing of facial identity and expressions interact, and 
hence are not fully independent. We further demonstrate that the architecture of the 
relations depends on experience; where experience leads to higher degree of inter-
dependence in the processing of identity and expressions. We propose that this change 
occurs as integrative processes are more efficient than parallel. Finally, we argue that 
the dynamic aspects of face processing need to be incorporated into theories in this 
field. 
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Introduction 
It is difficult to find more a complex source of information in social interaction 
than human faces. Gaze direction, emotional expression and identity are perceived 
very rapidly allowing us to make a judgment of a face seen for less than a hundred 
milliseconds. How is this broad range of facial information processed by our 
perceptual system? To answer this question, scientists have used two general 
approaches. The first focuses on the independent manipulation of each type of facial 
information, e.g. emotional expressions (Adolphs, 2002; Balconi & Lucchiari, 2005; 
Bartlett, Hager, Ekman, & Sejnowski, 1999; Bassili, 1979; Baudouin, Gilibert, 
Sansone, & Tiberghien, 2000; Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000); person identity 
(Baudouin & Humphreys, 2006; Bruce, Doyle, Dench, & Burton, 1991; Caharel, 
Jiang, Blanz, & Rossion, 2009; Collishaw & Hole, 2000). The second approach is to 
manipulate both types of information together, to determine whether different types of 
facial information are processed in an integrative or independent manner (Bruce & 
Young, 1986; Calder & Young, 2005; Campbell, Landis, & Regard, 1986; Curby, 
Johnson, & Tyson, 2012; de Gelder, Frissen, Barton, & Hadjikhani, 2003; Etcoff, 
1984; Wild-Wall, 2004). The focus of this review is on studies adopting the latter 
approach to address the still outstanding question of whether identity and emotional 
expression information in faces are processed independently or interactively. We 
attempt to answer this question using novel application of mathematical procedures to 
psychological problems. We further discuss the novel hypothesis that the architecture 
of face processing is dynamic and shaped by experience.   
Three paradigms are commonly used with healthy participants to assess the 
relationship between factors in systematic ways: the ‘Garner paradigm’, the facial 
composite paradigm and the divided attention paradigm. Methodological issues 
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within each paradigm and the contrasting processes that they ‘weight’ are described in 
detail.  The review begins with a brief highlight of the three views on interactive 
versus independent processing of identity and emotion in faces and the supporting 
evidence for each. The three following sections present the evidence on interactions 
between identity and emotional expression from studies employing each task. The last 
section summarizes our knowledge about the relations between identity and emotion 
processing in faces and proposes directions for further studies.  
1. Three views on interactions between identity and emotional expression 
processing in faces 
A critical question, fundamental for building models of face processing, is 
whether identity and emotional expressions in faces interact or whether they are 
processed by strictly separated routes. This section provides a brief summary of 
contemporary views on the relationship between the two types of facial information. 
To date, three accounts have been proposed.   
The first account – independent processing - proposes that there is separate 
and parallel processing of identity and emotional expression signals from faces (Bruce 
& Young, 1986).  The main support for the separate-parallel routes comes from 
neuropsychological studies showing double dissociations in emotion and identity 
processing. Patients have been reported to have impaired recognition of face identity 
but not emotion (Bruyer et al., 1983; Jones & Tranel, 2001; Nunn, Postma, & 
Pearson, 2001), while other patients have impaired discrimination of face expression 
but not identity (Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993) or impairments at 
recognizing specific emotion (e.g. Adolphs et al., 1994; Calder et al., 2000).  
The second account – asymmetric dependency - argues for asymmetric 
processing of identity and emotional expression in faces; namely that emotion 
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processing depends on facial identity coding but not vice versa (Atkinson, Tipples, 
Burt, & Young, 2005; Baudouin et al., 2000; Kaufmann & Schweinberger, 2004; 
Schweinberger, Burton, & Kelly, 1999; Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998). A common 
finding in studies that support asymmetric dependency is that observers are able to 
attend and respond to the identity of faces while ignoring emotional and speech 
expressions, but they are unable to ignore identity when attending and responding to 
either emotional expression or speech (Schweinberger et al., 1999; Schweinberger & 
Soukup, 1998). Similar results have been reported in studies examining the 
relationship between gender and emotion in faces (Atkinson et al., 2005; Le Gal & 
Bruce, 2002). These findings are consistent with the idea that information about 
invariant aspects of faces influences how changeable aspects of faces are computed, 
while information about their changeable aspects of faces does not influence the 
processing of invariant face properties (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000).  
The third account – interactive processing - supports the idea of interactive 
processing between facial identity and emotion (Ganel & Goshen-Gottstein, 2002, 
2004; Wang, Fu, Johnston, & Yan, 2013; Wild-Wall, 2004; Yankouskaya, Booth, & 
Humphreys, 2012). Ganel and Goshen-Gottshtein (2002, 2004) provide evidence for 
symmetric interference between facial identity and emotions in familiar faces and 
proposed that the mechanisms involved in processing familiar identity and expression 
are interconnected, with facial identity serving as a reference from which different 
expressions are more easily derived (Ganel & Goshen-Gottstein, 2002, 2004). Study 
by Yankouskaya at al. (2012) further support the interactive view by demonstrating 
redundancy gains and super capacity in processing faces containing both a target 
identity and emotional expression as compared when single target (a target identity or 
emotion) is present. The interactive model is also supported by neuroimaging findings 
(see for review Calder & Young, 2005).  
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It is important to note the asymmetric and symmetric interactive accounts do not 
necessarily imply that there is only one shared mechanism for processing identity and 
emotion information from faces (Calder & Young, 2005). These accounts suggest a 
high degree of interconnection between emotion and identity processing, whether they 
are incorporated in one representational space (Calder & Young, 2005), or in separate 
ones (Haxby et al., 2002).   
In the following sections we discuss in detail evidence based on formal testing of 
the three models of identity and expression processing.   
1.1 The Garner task 
The Garner paradigm was originally designed to establish the nature of the 
relationship between the properties of two-dimensional stimuli (Garner, 1974).  It is 
assumed that if two dimensions of a stimulus are processed interactively, variation in 
one dimension will interfere with processing of the second dimension. In contrast, if 
the two dimensions are processed independently, there will be no interference from 
each other. Typically an observer is required to make speeded two-choice 
classifications of four types of stimuli as the two dimensions of the stimuli are varied 
orthogonally. The stimuli are presented in three experimental conditions: a control 
condition (the stimuli vary along a relevant dimension, while the irrelevant dimension 
is held constant); an orthogonal condition (both the relevant and irrelevant dimensions 
vary); and a correlated condition (the two dimensions co-vary). Garner interference 
(GI) is defined as an increase in reaction times (RTs) and/or error rates for the 
relevant target dimension in the orthogonal condition relative to the constant and the 
correlated conditions. The difference between the correlated and constant blocks 
provides a measure for the potential benefit arising from integrating the two factors. 
Though this aspect is rarely considered in studies using the Garner paradigm. 
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Results based on the Garner paradigm provide conflicting results. While some 
studies show no interference in responses to either expression or identity, suggesting 
independent processing (e.g. Etcoff, 1984), others show an asymmetrical effect (effect 
of identity on expression but not vice versa; e.g. Schweinbger & Soukup, 1998), 
symmetrical effects with familiar faces (but not with unfamiliar faces) (e.g. Ganel & 
Goschen-Gottstein, 2004) or symmetrical interactions between facial expression and 
facial familiarity that emerge for some expressions (happiness and neutral), but not 
for others (disgust and fear) (Wild-Wall, 2004). One possible reason for the 
variability in the results may be the use of a small stimulus set in many studies using 
this paradigm. Typically only two different stimuli exemplars displaying one of two 
emotions are used (e.g. see  Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998). This limited set of 
stimuli is repeated across trials allowing the development of a strategy of 
discriminating stimuli based on local image details (e.g., variations in lighting, 
photographic grain) rather than on expression and identity. Such a strategy may limit 
interference between the dimensions. Another important issue is that different picture- 
based strategies may be used for the identity and emotion decision tasks in the Garner 
paradigm. In the identity decision task pictorial strategies might be used to 
discriminate individuals based on the shape of a face or on non-facial cues such as 
hair style (e.g., see the stimuli in Etcoff (1994) and Schweinberger & Soukup (1998) 
for example). For the expression decision task however, where participants are 
required to attend to internal facial features, this strategy may be inappropriate. This 
can lead to differences in task difficulty which may contribute to the asymmetric 
interference effects between identity and emotional expression judgments.  
The relative discriminability between the exemplars of the two dimensions can 
also affect results in the Garner paradigm. Wang et al. (2013) orthogonally 
manipulated the discriminability (Disc) of stimuli within the two relevant dimensions 
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(e.g. high Disc identities & high Disc expressions, high Disc identities & low Disc 
expressions).  The results showed asymmetric interference from identity to emotional 
expression when the discriminability of the facial expression was low and that of 
facial identity was high. In contrast there was interference from emotional expression 
on identity when the discriminability of facial expression was high and that of facial 
identity low.  When both dimensions were low in discriminability, interference was 
found in both directions, while there was no interference when both dimensions were 
highly discriminable. The authors argued that, when discriminability is low, people 
refer to additional information from an irrelevant dimension, and this results in Garner 
interference (Wang et al., 2013). Ganel & Goshen-Gottshtein (2004) controlled for 
pictorial processing strategies and they also equated the discriminability of identity 
and expression judgments. In this case symmetric interference was found between 
expression and identity judgments, though only for familiar faces (Ganel & Goshen-
Gottstein, 2004). 
Taken together, the above studies suggest that degree of interaction between 
identity and emotional expression in faces is associated with the level of 
discriminability of the two dimensions. It is less clear, however, why no interaction is 
observed when both dimensions are highly discriminable. It is possible that 
participants process each relevant dimension separately from the irrelevant one, 
because there is enough information carried by each dimension. However, there is 
also the possibility that in the orthogonal condition participants tend to switch their 
attention between the two dimensions that constantly change. Hence in some occasion 
participants direct attention to the irrelevant dimension which leads to potential 
increase in errors and longer RT. Thus, the effects of the unattended stimulus 
dimensions arise due to trial-by-trial fluctuations in attention that lead to the irrelevant 
dimension sometimes being attended (Lavie & Tsal, 1994; Weissman, Warner, & 
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Woldorff, 2009). On these occasions performance will be affected by variation in the 
irrelevant dimension, even though the dimensions might be processed independently. 
1.2 The composite face task 
Composite faces combine the top half of one face with the bottom half of 
another face. When aligned, the two face halves appear to fuse together to produce a 
novel face, making it difficult to selectively process either half of the composite by 
itself (McKone, 2008; Mondloch, Maurer, & Ahola, 2006; Rhodes, Hayward, & 
Winkler, 2006; Rossion, 2013; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). In the composite 
paradigm, the task is to attend to one half of the face (e.g., the top), and either name it 
(naming version) or determine whether it is the same or different to the half face in a 
second composite stimulus (matching version), while ignoring the non-target half 
(e.g., the bottom part of the face). There are two critical conditions: when the two 
halves of the faces are aligned – “encouraging” holistic processing, or when the two 
halves are not aligned – when there is less likelihood of processing them as a single 
perceptual unit. Note, that as in the Garner paradigm, perceptual integration is 
indexed by the level of interference of the irrelevant dimension on the processing of 
the relevant dimension.   
When the two halves of the faces are smoothly aligned, the novel face in the 
composite condition can create a conflicting situation as it does not match the identity 
of either the top or the bottom half. In contrast, when two halves are misaligned, the 
face is not encoded as a perceptual whole, and the information of either part can be 
assessed without mutual interference. The robust finding is that participants are 
slower, and less accurate in identity judgments of the top half when the face halves 
are vertically aligned compared to when they are spatially unaligned (e.g., McKone, 
2008; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). Similar to the effects with facial identity, 
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there is also a composite effect for emotional expressions (Calder et al. (2000, 
Experiment 1)).  
Interestingly, when identity and expression information are combined, the 
composite effect in identity has been found to operate independently of the effect in 
emotional expression. In Calder et al. (2000, Experiment 4), three types of composite 
faces were employed: (i) two halves of the same person posing different facial 
expressions (same-identity/different-expression composites), (ii) two halves of 
different people posing the same facial expression (different-identity/same-expression 
composites), and (iii) two halves of different identities posing different facial 
expressions (different-identity/different- expression composites). Participants 
performed two tasks: judging the identity or the expression of each face.  The RT 
pattern depended on the task. In the identity task, judging the identity of the top half 
of the face was facilitated if it matched the identity of the bottom half, and this was 
independent of whether the expressions (the irrelevant dimension in this case) 
matched or mismatched. Similarly in the expression task, when the two halves were 
matched for expression responses were facilitated independent of facial identities. 
Thus, the results indicated that people could selectively attend to either of the facial 
dimensions (see a similar conclusion in Etcoff’s (1984) study where participants 
performed a Garner task).  
Critical examination of Calder at al.’s (2000) Experiment 4 highlights a few 
important points. First the authors did not equate for difficulty across the condition 
and trial types (e.g., identity decisions were easier than expression decisions). It could 
be that when decisions are easier, participants tend to rely on a single source of 
information to make the decision (Wang et al., 2013); however if the decision is 
difficult the participants  may refer to the irrelevant dimensions to provide  additional 
information to make a correct classification judgment or they may need a longer time 
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to ignore the irrelevant information. In both cases this does not imply complete 
independence between the coding of identity and emotional expression. Second, the 
high cognitive demands on the perceptual system, required to focus attention on just 
one part of the faces, may have affected the results. For example, similar to the 
Garner task, participants may have attended to the irrelevant dimension due to trial-
by-trial fluctuations in attention or local details of the images. Finally, the results may 
reflect a tradeoff between speed and accuracy, as the accuracy results indicate that 
most errors were made during conditions where the top and bottom halves did not 
match on either expression or identity. Furthermore, Richler et al. (2008) found that 
discriminability (d’) on trials when both face halves had same identity was higher 
than discriminability on trials when the two halves had different identities. In 
summary, the composite face task cannot unambiguously provide evidence for 
separate routes for processing of facial identity and emotional expressions.  
1.3 The divided attention task 
The divided attention task has been used in studies examining holistic versus 
featural processing in faces (Wenger & Townsend, 2001) and independent vs 
interactive processing of identity and expressed emotion in faces (Wenger & 
Townsend, 2001; Yankouskaya et al., 2012; Yankouskaya, Humphreys, & Rotshtein, 
2014; Yankouskaya, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2014). 
In the divided attention task, participants are required to monitor two sources of 
information simultaneously for a target to decide if the target is present or absent.  
There are two main advantages in employing the divided attention task. First, the task 
requires people to attend to facial identity and emotional expression simultaneously – 
a situation that closely resembles daily life. Second, in contrast to the selective 
attention task, the divided attention task controls for performance in the single target 
12	  	  
conditions by including the double target display. There is considerable evidence that, 
when a visual display contains two targets that require the same response, reaction 
times (RTs) are faster compared to when only one target appears (Miller, 1982; 
Miller, Ulrich, & Lamarre, 2001; Mordkoff & Miller, 1993; Wenger & Townsend, 
2006). For example, in Mordkoff & Miller’s (1993) study participants were required 
to divide their attention between the separable dimensions of colour and shape, with 
all stimulus features being attributes of a single object. Participants were asked to 
press a button if the target colour (green), the target shape (X), or both target features 
(green X) were displayed, or to withhold their response. The mean RT on redundant 
target trials was significantly less than the mean RT on single target trials (Mordkoff 
& Miller, 1993).  
Although different explanations can be put forward to account for this 
redundant target effect (RTE), the most relevant here are the Independent Race Model 
(Raab, 1962) and the Coactivation Model (Miller, 1982). According to the 
Independent Race Model, redundancy gains are explained by means of ‘statistical 
facilitation’ (Raab, 1962). Whenever two targets are presented simultaneously, the 
faster signal determines the response ‘target present’ (i.e. this signal wins the race). 
As long as the processing time distributions for the two signals overlap, RTs will be 
speeded when two targets occur since the winning signal can always be used for the 
response (Raab, 1962). Note, that signal which finishes ‘first’ may depend on whether 
it is attended. For example, emotional expression or identity may be computed first, if 
there are fluctuations in attention to each independent dimension.  
An alternative explanation for the RTE is the coactivation view. According to 
this model, the information supporting a response ‘target present’ is pooled across the 
features defining the targets prior to response execution (Miller, 1982). When both 
target identity and target emotional expression contribute activation toward the same 
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decision threshold, the response will be activated more rapidly relative to when only 
one attribute contributes activation. 
The critical contrast for the two models compares the probability for the 
response times obtained on redundant targets trials relative to the sum of probabilities 
for responses being made to either single target trial. The Independent Race Model 
holds that at no point in the cumulative distribution functions should the probability of 
a response to redundant targets exceed the sum of the probabilities for responses to 
either single target. In contrast, the coactivation account predicts that responses to the 
redundant targets can be made before either single target generates enough activation 
to produce a response. Thus, the number of fastest responses to a face containing both 
the target identity and the target emotional expression should be larger than the 
number of fastest responses to either target facial identity or target expression when 
presented as single targets. The procedure assessing the relations between the number 
of fast responses in the single target trials vs. the dual target trails is referred to as the 
Miller inequality test, or the race model inequality test.  
An alternative approach to test independence vs co-activation processing is by 
examining the effects of the RTE on the workload capacity of the system (Townsend 
& Nozawa, 1995). The concept of workload capacity reflects the efficiency with 
which a cognitive system performs a task. Mathematically, the workload capacity 
(C(t)) is defined by the hazard function that gives the rate of process completion at 
any point time (when the process under an observation has not yet completed) 
(Townsend & Wenger, 2004). Importantly, the yardstick for the capacity model 
(Townsend & Nozawa, 1995) is the standard parallel model (e.g., The Independent 
Race Model (Raab, 1962)) where processing on individual dimensions does not 
change with increasing workload and signals are processed in parallel without mutual 
interference. In terms of the capacity model, the standard parallel processing model is 
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associated with unlimited capacity (C(t) = 1), as processing one dimension has no 
impact on the processing of the second dimension. Processing with limited capacity 
(C(t) < 1) is associated with decreasing performance (e.g., slowing in RT) when the 
workload increases and the system performs sub-optimally. On the other hand the 
overall workload could decrease when redundant targets are presented, leading to 
facilitation in performance (e.g., faster RT). In this case the system is said to operate 
at super capacity (C(t) > 1)).  The super capacity emerges since a decision is made 
before any single dimension alone provides sufficient evidence to support it. Hence 
less processing was needed of each dimension to enable a decision – making the 
process more efficient. The super capacity mode violates the race model inequality 
(Townsend & Eidels, 2011; Townsend & Wenger, 2004), suggesting positive 
dependency between the two dimensions. 
The Race Model and the capacity measure have been used in tests of 
independence vs coactivation in the processing of facial identity and emotional 
expression. Yankouskaya, et al. (2012) employed the divided attention task under 
conditions where participants had to detect target identities and target emotional 
expressions from photographs of a set target faces. Three of these photographs 
contained targets: stimulus 1 had both the target identity and the target emotion (i.e. 
redundant target); stimulus 2 contained the target identity and a non-target emotional 
expression; stimulus 3 contained the target emotional expression and a non-target 
identity (Figure 1). Three non-target faces were photographs of three different people, 
and expressed emotions different to those in target faces. Identity, gender and 
emotional expression information were varied across these studies.   
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
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The general results showed that supper-additive redundancy gains occurred 
between face identity and emotional expression. Particularly striking was the finding 
that there were violations of the race model inequality test (Miller, 1982) when the 
target identity was combined with the target expression in a single face. Violation of 
the race model inequality occurred for combinations of sad or an anger expression 
with facial identity but not when identity was combined with a neutral expression. In 
the last case, the authors report no evidence for any redundancy gain. Yankouskaya, 
et al. (2012) suggest that unfamiliar faces bearing a neutral expression do not carry 
expression-contingent features and a neutral expression may be defined by the 
absence of an expression, making it more idiosyncratic to the particular face.  
Importantly, the mathematical tests of the race model and capacity measures 
provide us with a precise analysis of the relationship between the processing of 
identity and emotional expression (Yankouskaya et al., 2012), facilitating estimation 
of the effect of different factors on the relationship (Yankouskaya, Humphreys, et al., 
2014; Yankouskaya, Rotshtein, et al., 2014).  
Taken together the data derived from the divided attention task within the 
framework of the race model and capacity measures of processing are consistent with 
coactive processing when a target identity is paired with a distinct emotional 
expression. The coactivation is beneficial for the cognitive system as it allows to pool 
together information derived from identity and emotion in faces leading to super 
capacity of the system. This super capacity emerges since combining information 
reduces the demands of resources compared to when each channel is consider 
independently. 
2. Do experience and familiarity with faces modulate the way that expression and 
identity processing interact?  
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Based on common observation, the recognition of identity and emotional 
expression in faces in everyday life is easy. We can catch a face of familiar person in 
a crowd or an expression in a face in few seconds. In return, we are typically quick at 
making a judgment if a briefly seen face is unfamiliar or whether a stranger’s face has 
a particular expression. On the other hand, it may take longer for us to recognize a 
familiar face with an unusual expression or a stranger’s smiling face, because it 
makes us doubt whether the person is familiar or not (Baudouin et al., 2000). These 
examples show that familiarity judgments to faces are affected by the expression of 
the faces, and the interaction occurs for both unfamiliar and familiar faces (Baudouin 
et al., 2000; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008; Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003; 
Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Wild-Wall, 2004). Familiarity with faces can be 
conceptualized at multiple levels: 1) continuous contact across the lifespan with faces 
in general may gradually shape the way we process faces; 2) there may be familiarity 
for faces from specific ethnical/relevant cultural group; and 3) there may be 
familiarity and increased experience with the face of specific individuals (including 
both media channels and direct social interactions).  
Experience with human faces changes across the lifespan and affects the way 
we process faces. For example, the processing of both identity and expressions 
improves from childhood to adulthood (Baudouin, Gallay, Durand, & Robichon, 
2010; Germine, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2011; Schwarzer, 2000) and gradually 
declines in older people (Obermeyer, Kolling, Schaich, & Knopf, 2012; Plude & 
Hoyer, 1986; Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, & Phillips, 2008). It is unclear, however, 
whether general experience with faces through the lifespan affects the way identity 
and expression interact.  
We used the divided attention paradigm to assess how aging affects the 
integration of visual information from faces. Three groups of participants aged 20-30, 
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40-50 and 60-70 performed a divided attention task in which they had to detect the 
presence of a target facial identity or a target facial expression. Three target stimuli 
were used: 1) with the target identity but not the target expression; 2) with the target 
expression but not the target identity; and 3) with both the target identity and target 
expressions (the redundant target condition). On non-target trials the faces contained 
neither the target identity nor the target expression. All groups were faster in 
responding to a face containing both the target identity and emotion compared to 
faces containing either single target. Furthermore the redundancy gains for combined 
targets exceeded performance limits predicted by the independent processing of facial 
identity and emotion. These results held across the age range suggesting that there is 
interactive processing of facial identity and emotion which is independent of the 
effects of cognitive aging. Remarkably, there was an increase in the extent of co-
activation across trials throughout the adulthood lifespan so that, with increased age 
the benefits of redundant targets were larger. This was reflected by an increased 
probability of fast response trials and increased processing efficiency evidenced by 
‘higher’ super-capacity.  (Figures 2,3). 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
The evidence on the effects of life experience with faces is mirrored by the data 
on processing faces from same versus a different race. It is well documented that the 
processing of own-race faces is advantaged for both expressions (Elfenbein & 
Ambady, 2002; Kubota & Ito, 2007) and identity (Cassidy, Quinn, & Humphreys, 
2011; Kito & Lee, 2002; Levin, 2000; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 
2006; Walker & Tanaka, 2003). In a recent study Yankouskaya and colleagues 
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(Yankouskaya, Humphreys, et al., 2014) showed that experience with own race faces 
affected the integration of   identity and emotional information. The relations between 
the processing of facial identity and emotion in own- and other-race faces were 
examined using a fully crossed design with participants from 3 different ethnicities all 
residing in the UK at the time of the study (Yankouskaya, Humphreys, et al., 2014). 
Three groups of participants (European, African and Asian individuals) performed the 
divided attention task on three sets of 6 female portrait photographs for each ethnic 
group. In each set, three photographs contained targets: Stimulus 1 had both the target 
identity and the target emotion, sad (IE); Stimulus 2 contained the target identity and 
a non-target emotional expression, happy (I); Stimulus 3 contained the target 
emotional expression, sad, and a non-target identity (E). Three non-target faces were 
photographs of three other people expressing emotions different from those in target 
faces (angry, surprised, and neutral). The benefits of redundant identity and emotion 
signals were evaluated and formally tested in relation to models of independent and 
coactive feature processing and measures of processing capacity for the different 
types of stimuli (see details in section 1.3). The results suggested that coactive 
processing of identity and emotion that was linked to super capacity for own-race but 
not for other-race faces (Figure 4). 
Furthermore, in the study of Yankouskaya, Humphreys et al. (2014), the 
evidence for a race effect on the integration of emotion and identity information was 
asymmetric. European participants only showed evidence of perceptual integration for 
their own race faces. However African and Asian participants showed this both for 
their own race faces and for European faces, but they did not show it respectively for 
Asian and African (both other-race) faces (Figure 4). This asymmetry reflects number 
of contacts with other race faces; as all participants were residing in the UK at the 
time of testing, the Asian and African participants had greater familiarity with 
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European faces than Europeans had with Asian and African faces (Table 1). A formal 
test show that variations in the size of the redundancy gains across other race faces 
were strongly linked to the number of social contacts, but less so to the quality of the 
contact with other-race members.  This suggests that experience with faces facilitates 
the coactive processing of identity and emotional expression. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 
 Mean number (standard deviation in brackets) of well-known own and other-race 
people for groups of European, African and Asian participants 
Group of 
participants 
Number of well-known own and other race people 
 European African Asian 
European 6.8* (2.1) 3.2 (1.3) 2.9 (0.6) 
African 9.3 (3.4) 16.7 (4.1) 7.8 (4.2) 
Asian 5.1 (2.2) 5.3 (2.5) 11.4 (4.9) 
* In bold for own race people 
The capacity analysis also demonstrated super capacity for processing identity and 
emotional expression within own-race faces, indicating that the observed responses 
for the redundant target face were greater than predicted by the combined response to 
single targets (Figure 5).  In contrast, adding information to other-race faces generated 
results indicative of a negative dependency and suggesting that the processing of 
identity and emotional expression in other-race faces operates with limited capacity. 
The negative dependency for other-race faces held true for European participants but 
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not for African and Asian groups where responses for European faces showed 
positive dependency.  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Collectively, these results suggest that one component of the own race face 
advantage is the increase in the integration of identity and emotional expression 
information in own-race faces. This effect is strongly linked to individual experience 
with particular types of face.  
Finally, familiarity with specific individuals can also change the way 
information from the face is processed. Ganel & Goshen-Gottshtein (2004) predicted 
that Garner Interference should be greater for familiar compared to unfamiliar faces, 
because representations of familiar faces contain richer and more detailed structural 
descriptions than representations of unfamiliar faces. As a consequence perceivers 
should be more likely to be sensitive to the associations between invariant and 
changeable aspects of familiar faces than they are to those of unfamiliar faces (Ganel 
& Goshen-Gottstein, 2004). This was demonstrated using the Garner paradigm where 
participants had to make identity and emotion judgments for personally familiar and 
unfamiliar faces. The authors report that interference between identity and expression 
increased for familiar faces (Ganel & Goshen-Gottstein, 2004), consistent with this 
information being processed in a more integral way in this case.  
Taken together, the studies above suggest that familiarity modulates the 
relationship between the processing of identity and emotional expression in faces. 
Increased experience with faces lead to increased integration of information. As 
discussed above, pooling information across multiple channels allow the system to 
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operate at super capacity, so enhancing processing efficiency. We suggest that 
experience with faces results in a qualitative change to the way faces are processed. 
Importantly this change occurs in adulthood, demonstrating that our face processing 
system retains flexibility throughout life. Furthermore, the above results show that 
there is no one system for processing faces, but multiple mechanisms operate in 
parallel depending on the faces processed and on our previous experience with them – 
for example, the identity and emotion of novel faces (e.g., faces from a different 
ethnicity) are processed in parallel, while identity and emotion information from 
highly familiar face types are integrated. Thus we propose that experience shapes the 
connections between different processing channels and thereby increasing the efficacy 
of the processing in each of the individual channels. This brings up the question at 
what stage of the face processing identity and emotions are connected.  
3.	  At	  what	  stage	  of	  the	  processing	  information	  on	  identity	  and	  emotion	  is	  
integrated	  
There are several stages of processing at which identity and expression/emotion 
could interact during face processing. The coactivation view (Miller, 1982) suggests 
that the interaction between identity and emotional expression leading to a super-
redundancy gain occurs just after the two stimuli have been separately coded, but 
prior to a decision about target presence. The interactive view (Mordkoff & Yantis, 
1991) suggests that information about facial identity and emotional expression may be 
exchanged at early perceptual levels (inter-stimulus crosstalk) or at a decisional stage 
(non-target response bias). We next briefly discuss studies which may offer some 
resolution to these conflicting views. 
 Evidence for separate mechanisms for emotion and identity processing that 
interact prior to the decision comes primarily from neuropsychological cases and 
neuroimaging studies. The neuropsychological evidence mentioned above 
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(Behrmann, Avidan, Gao, & Black, 2007; Riddoch, Johnston, Bracewell, Boutsen, & 
Humphreys, 2008) showing a double dissociation between expression and identity 
processing. Neuroimaging studies suggest that different neural structures are involved 
in processing identity (invariant) and emotion (variant) information (Haxby et al., 
2002). For example, it is shown that regions within the superior temporal process 
expressions, while regions along the Fusiform Gyrus process identity (Winston et al., 
2005). It is further shown that processing within these two regions is relatively 
separated (Fairhall & Ishai, 2007). Taken together it is suggested that at some stage 
identity and expression are processed separately. 
The alternative view suggests a single mechanism for processing identity and 
expressions from faces (Calder and Young, 2005). Thus arguing that identity and 
expression are not processed by dissociated mechanisms, but instead these two 
dimensions are processed within a single multi-dimensional space. This view relies on 
computational, neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence. Computationally, it is 
shown that the principle components derived from pictures of different identity posing 
different expressions, contains identity specific, emotion specific and shared emotion 
and identity components (Cottrell, Branson, & Calder, 2002).  Thus the authors argue 
that within a single face representation system, different dimensions code for 
dissociated as well as shared features across the two dimensions.  Critical review of 
neuropsychological studies by Calder and Young (2005) further suggest that most 
patients who are impaired at identity processing (prosopagnosia) also show impaired 
emotion recognition, when formally tested, albeit less severe. Finally, Calder and 
Young review neuroimaging studies showing that regions along the Fusiform Gyrus 
(assumed to be solely processing identity) often show sensitivity to the facial 
expression (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003) while regions along the 
superior temporal (assume to be dedicated to expression) are often sensitive to the 
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face identity (Winston et al., 2005). 
In summary, it is unclear whether the interactive nature of emotion and identity 
arise from a single multi-dimensional space or due to interaction between different 
processing streams. Further research is needed to address this question, maybe using 
methods that have higher time resolution such as EEG or MEG. 
 
Conclusion 
We started our review by outlining three accounts for the relationship between 
the processing of identity and emotional expression in faces: independent, asymmetric 
and co-active processing of the two facial dimensions. We discussed in details support 
for each account from studies employing the Garner inference paradigm, the 
composite faces paradigm, and the divided attention paradigm. Based on this we 
conclude:  
First, there is compelling evidence against strictly independent processing of 
identity and emotional expression (Ganel & Goshen-Gottstein, 2002, 2004; Wang et 
al., 2013), with perhaps the strongest evidence coming from studies of redundancy 
gains (particularly the mathematical tests against models assuming independent 
processing of expression and identity) (Fitousi & Wenger, 2013; Yankouskaya et al., 
2012; Yankouskaya, Humphreys, et al., 2014; Yankouskaya, Rotshtein, et al., 2014).  
Second, there are two crucial conditions for the interaction to occur: equal 
discriminability of identity and emotional expression (Ganel & Goshen-Gottstein, 
2002; Wang et al., 2013) and an expression that is emotionally valenced (i.e., other 
than a neutral expression) (Yankouskaya et al., 2012).  
Third, interactive processing of identity and emotional information in faces is 
modulated by familiarity and experience with faces (Ganel & Goshen-Gottshtein, 
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2004; Yankouskaya, Humphreys, et al., 2014). Both greater familiarity and 
experience with faces facilitate the interaction.  
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 Figure 1. An example of the stimuli in Yankouskaya et al. (2012). IE – a face containing 
both the target identity and the target emotional expression; I – a face containing the target 
identity but not the expression; E – a face containing  target emotional expression; NT1-NT3 
faces containing neither the  target identity nor the target emotion. In this study we used faces 
from the NimStim database, but because of publication restriction on faces from that 
30	  	  
database, we presenting here other faces (taken from Ekman & Frissen, 1972) as examples 
only. 
Figure 2. Cumulative distribution function plots (CDFs)1. The x-axis presented 
the trials RT the y-axis present the number of trials. For a given point on the CDF the 
total number of trials in each condition (value on y) with RT less than specified value 
on the x-axis. The redundant targets (IE) are plotted in green, the sum of the 
distributions of the single targets: emotional expression and identity targets (I+E) is 
plotted in purple and each single targets (E) and (I) is plotted in black. The crucial 
comparison is between the green and the purple lines. Results for the young are 
presented in the top left panel, middle aged in top right panel and older in the lower 
panel (data reported in Yankouskaya, Rotshtein, et al., 2014).  
1	  Graphic representations of the distributions were constructed using group RT 
distributions obtained by averaging individual RT distributions (Ulrich, Miller, & 
Schroter, 2007). When the CDFs are plotted, the Independent Race Model requires 
that the CDF of the redundant targets trials falls below and to the right of the summed 
CDF (less fast responding trials for the redundant target compared with the number of 
fast trials for both single targets), any reliable violation of this pattern provides 
support for the co-activation model. 
 
Figure 3. Capacity coefficients for the three groups of participants: top row 
young adult, middle row– middle-aged people. The horizontal line at C(t) = 1 
indicates the reference value for unlimited capacity. The capacity coefficients are 	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depicted in solid line; the confidence interval is in dashed line (data reported in 
Yankouskaya, Rotshtein, at al. (2014) 
 
Figure 4. Data from the race inequality test for three groups of participants: 
European, African and Asian: top row European participants (own-race, African and 
Asian faces from the left to the right), middle row– African participants (European, 
African and Asian faces from the left to the right), low row– Asian participants 
(European, African and own-race faces from the left to the right). I – target identity 
and E – target emotion (in black), IE – both target identity and target emotion (in 
green), I+E – the sum of distributions for I and E (in purple). These graphs show 
whether the redundant target information is processed coactively (IE line places on 
the left of the I+E line, see for details Yankouskaya, Humphreys, et al., 2014).  
 
Figure 5. Capacity coefficients for the three participants: top row European 
participants (own-race, African and Asian faces from the left to the right), middle 
row– African participants (European, African and Asian faces from the left to the 
right), the bottom row – Asian participants (European, African and Asian faces from 
the left to the right). The horizontal line at C(t) = 1 indicates the reference value for 
unlimited capacity. The capacity coefficients are depicted in solid line; the confidence 
interval is in dashed line. Data reported in Yankouskaya, Humphreys, et al. (2014) 
 
 
Figure 1.JPEG
Figure 2.JPEG
Figure 3.JPEG
Figure 4.JPEG
Figure 5.JPEG
